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For the team of national security correspondents who sit along the west side of The New York Times’s Washington bureau, there is almost nothing more revealing — or, in the Trump era, more politically charged — than an annual exercise mandated by Congress called the “Worldwide Threat Assessment.” It is the one moment each year that the chiefs of America’s biggest intelligence agencies — the Central Intelligence Agency, the F.B.I. and the National Security Agency, along with lesser-known but giant agencies that defend American troops or run spy satellites — are required to explain what worries them, and to rank the threats facing the country.
In a public, declassified way, they have to summarize their judgments about whether the North Koreans will ever give up their arsenal, whether the Iranians are violating a nuclear deal that the United States has already renounced, and how much progress is being made defeating terror groups like the Islamic State.
That task has never been a straightforward one — especially when an intelligence finding complicates, or undermines, a president’s desired outcomes. President Barack Obama’s director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr., usually opened his testimony by complaining that he had to deliver those assessments in public — naturally secretive, the intelligence leaders prefer to talk to Congress behind closed doors.
But in the Trump era, the task is infinitely more complicated: The intelligence chiefs know that every word they utter will be judged in the Oval Office by whether the independent, fact-based judgments of the roughly billion intelligence enterprise promote or undercut Mr. Trump’s instincts and policies.
So as my colleague Julian Barnes and I prepared for this year’s testimony, I remembered the comment that the head of one of the agencies made to me during a holiday party in December. “My objective for the year,” this official said, half-jokingly, “is to stay out of the president’s Twitter feed.”
No such luck. A day after the testimony at the very end of January — and only after he had read the coverage that contrasted with his own descriptions of those problems — the president erupted. “The Intelligence people seem to be extremely passive and naive when it comes to the dangers of Iran,” he tweeted, reacting to their conclusion that the mullahs in Iran are, for now, abiding by the 2015 agreement and are not producing new nuclear fuel for weapons.
He did not care for the assessment that Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader Mr. Trump will meet in Vietnam this month, will not give up all of his nuclear weapons, no matter what the president wants to believe. “Perhaps Intelligence should go back to school,” Mr. Trump tweeted. Then he summoned several of the chiefs to the White House and got them to agree, at least publicly, that the problem was not their conclusions, it was us — the biased journalists covering the open, public testimony. The testimony, he wrote, was “mischaracterized by the media,” and he assured everyone “we are very much in agreement on Iran, ISIS, North Korea, etc.”
They are not, obviously — just read the public document. But the moment crystallized one of the biggest challenges in covering national security issues in Washington these days: There’s what the government believes and what the president wants to believe. And when you compare the two, you are charged with taking sides, or inciting disagreements, in an effort to tear down Mr. Trump or weaken America in front of its adversaries.
In the days running up to Mr. Trump’s State of the Union address, more than one member of the administration accused me, my colleagues and The Times of deliberately highlighting those differences in an effort to provoke just the kind of reaction Mr. Trump had the morning after the testimony. Why don’t you just write it straight, one asked? Just say what the intelligence chiefs said, and not try to compare it to the president’s statements?
The answer is simple: We’re not stenographers. Our readers expect us to use decades of experience, as foreign correspondents around the world and as reporters who have delved into unclassified and classified data for years, to provide context into what an intelligence report on some of the most complex problems in the world really means. And we must assess the question of whether the president is integrating, ignoring or rejecting the conclusions of the intelligence community before he makes decisions.
As Mr. Trump likes to point out, intelligence agencies are not infallible — see “Iraq, nuclear weapons.” But the core of our job is helping readers understand the difference between facts on the ground, the “assessments” or judgments of the intelligence community, and the policy decisions that result.
So it is news when Mr. Trump decides he is going to deal with the Saudi crown prince, because the relationship with the kingdom outweighs the import of the C.I.A. conclusion, with medium-to-high certainty, that he was deeply involved in the killing of the dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi. (Mr. Trump called the C.I.A.’s view “feelings” rather than an assessment.) And hiding behind the fact that the C.I.A. conclusion is classified, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo did when asked about it the other day, does not silence the debate over how the United States should deal with a national leader suspected of being part of a murder conspiracy.
There was another reason to point out the differences: to prepare the country for the stark difference between the picture of the world the intelligence chiefs painted and the one Mr. Trump described last Tuesday night in his State of the Union address.
In Mr. Trump’s telling, the flood of illegal immigrants from unguarded stretches of the southwestern border is the No. 1 threat the United States must address. But drug trafficking, cartels and the issues of the Mexican border do not appear in the report until Page 18, and then comparatively fleetingly.
In the intelligence community’s judgment, it is cyber threats — to our electric grid, our privacy and our election system — that ranked No. 1, and occupied pages upon pages of the report. The intelligence chiefs, it turned out, are consumed by the long-term issues of the race with China over artificial intelligence and quantum computing, and whether we have enough programming and scientific talent in the pipeline to keep up, much less keep ahead. The issue never came up in the State of the Union address. Nor did the central conclusion of Mr. Trump’s own national security strategy: that the chief concern today has to be the renewal of great-power competition between the United States, Russia and China.
Sometimes the news is in the reports, the testimony, the leaked documents. Sometimes, it’s in the silences.B:
2017年12生肖【玄】【秉】【千】【还】【想】【说】【话】，【她】【已】【退】【后】【半】【步】，【垂】【下】【眼】【眸】：“【对】【不】【起】，【玄】【哥】，【我】【这】【样】【的】【人】，【跟】【你】【在】【一】【起】，【只】【会】【害】【了】【你】。【你】【这】【么】【优】【秀】【的】【人】，【前】【途】【无】【限】，【值】【得】【更】【好】【的】【女】【孩】【子】。【我】【们】【以】【后】【再】【不】【要】【见】【面】【了】。【你】【也】【不】【要】【再】【找】【我】【了】。” 【说】【完】【便】【上】【了】【楼】。 【玄】【秉】【千】【错】【愕】【几】【秒】，【追】【过】【去】，【却】【已】【经】【被】【保】【姆】【挡】【住】： “【玄】【先】【生】，【秦】【小】【姐】【现】【在】【身】【体】【还】【没】
【所】【有】【的】【异】【见】【都】【被】【一】【层】【层】【的】【递】【交】【记】【录】【分】【析】，【从】【中】【区】【分】【对】【比】【出】【最】【合】【理】【的】【记】【录】【在】【这】【文】【明】【的】【运】【行】【算】【法】【里】，【社】【会】【的】【运】【行】【越】【来】【越】【和】【谐】，【越】【来】【越】【稳】【定】，【越】【来】【越】【积】【极】【向】【上】。 【如】【果】【没】【有】【意】【外】，【这】【和】【谐】【将】【会】【一】【直】【持】【续】【下】【去】，【但】【意】【外】【总】【是】【在】【不】【经】【意】【之】【间】【发】【生】【的】。 【砰】！【然】【后】【这】【文】【明】【炸】【了】，【没】【有】【发】【生】【内】【乱】，【就】【是】【炸】【了】，【连】【烟】【火】【都】【没】【有】，【就】【是】【单】
【甄】【城】【目】【前】【是】【被】【半】【封】【锁】【的】。 【在】【城】【市】【通】【往】【华】【应】【大】【都】【中】【心】【的】【方】【向】，【当】【地】【安】【全】【部】【门】【设】【置】【了】【醒】【目】【的】【隔】【离】【带】，【平】【时】【有】【巡】【逻】【车】【来】【往】【巡】【逻】，【但】【因】【为】【资】【源】【有】【限】，【这】【里】【也】【不】【是】【出】【现】【了】【灵】【桥】，【所】【以】【并】【没】【有】【派】【遣】【专】【门】【除】【灵】【人】【驻】【守】。 【也】【就】【是】【说】，【如】【果】【有】【人】【想】【要】【偷】【偷】【摸】【摸】【进】【入】【甄】【城】，【会】【很】【容】【易】。 【但】【当】【前】【这】【个】【时】【代】，【没】【有】【普】【通】【人】【吃】【饱】【了】【撑】【的】【去】2017年12生肖【因】【为】【态】【古】【域】【的】【特】【殊】【性】，【此】【刻】**【之】【中】，【程】【凉】【和】【一】【个】【长】【相】【像】【蠕】【虫】【一】【样】【的】【无】【序】【者】【正】【在】【对】【峙】。 【仿】【佛】【太】【空】【一】【样】，【程】【凉】【的】【视】【角】【里】【这】【只】【蠕】【虫】【是】【肚】【皮】【朝】【上】【的】。 【蠕】【虫】【视】【角】【里】【的】【程】【凉】【是】【头】【朝】【下】【的】。 【危】【险】！ 【无】【序】【者】【基】【本】【是】【智】【慧】【崩】【坏】【掉】【的】【怪】【物】，【不】【遵】【守】【任】【何】【秩】【序】【法】【律】，【看】【到】【联】【盟】【人】【的】【意】【识】【出】【现】【在】**，【它】【们】【会】【对】【联】【盟】【人】【的】【意】【识】【进】
【真】【是】【和】【谐】【的】【一】【天】，【既】【调】【动】【军】【队】【来】，【平】【民】【们】【第】【一】【次】【安】【稳】【的】【有】【组】【织】【的】【示】【威】，【让】【看】【戏】【的】【人】【们】【觉】【得】【不】【可】【思】【议】。【第】【一】【次】【有】【军】【队】【参】【与】**【的】【时】【候】，【反】【抗】【是】【那】【么】【激】【烈】【是】【为】【什】【么】？ 【哦】，【是】【政】【策】，【政】【府】【的】【政】【策】【发】【生】【变】【化】。 【政】【府】【决】【定】【废】【除】【之】【前】【的】【法】【案】，【即】【使】【是】【招】【致】【其】【他】【方】【向】【都】【市】【人】【民】【的】【不】【满】，【尤】【其】【是】【西】【部】【都】【市】。 “【废】【除】【法】【案】【的】【理】【由】
【双】【栖】【艺】【人】？ 【在】【演】【艺】【圈】【中】，“【唱】【而】【优】【则】【演】”、“【演】【而】【优】【则】【唱】”【的】【现】【象】【屡】【见】【不】【鲜】，【当】【艺】【人】【在】【某】【一】【个】【行】【业】【取】【得】【了】【相】【当】【的】【成】【就】【之】【后】，【再】【跨】【界】【到】【另】【外】【一】【个】【行】【业】，【这】【其】【实】【并】【不】【是】【什】【么】【新】【鲜】【的】【事】【情】。 “【你】【舍】【得】【离】【开】【舞】【台】【吗】？” 【是】【啊】，【她】【付】【出】【了】【那】【么】【那】【么】【多】【的】【努】【力】，【可】【是】【偶】【像】【生】【涯】【却】【是】【转】【瞬】【即】【逝】【一】【般】【的】【短】【暂】，【她】【真】【的】【能】【够】【甘】【心】
【贺】【宇】【魂】【体】【的】【相】【貌】【倒】【不】【是】【他】【那】【全】【身】【上】【下】【缠】【绕】【着】【白】【布】【条】【一】【样】【的】【丑】【陋】【样】【子】，【反】【倒】【是】【控】【琴】【时】【的】【模】【样】。 【只】【是】【一】【个】【呈】【实】【体】，【一】【个】【呈】【半】【透】【魂】【体】。 【他】【的】【身】【体】【消】【弭】【前】【心】【脏】【处】【插】【着】【的】【那】【个】【簪】【子】，【现】【在】【转】【移】【到】【了】【他】【的】【魂】【魄】【上】，【让】【贺】【宇】【的】【行】【动】【受】【限】，【但】【还】【是】【保】【留】【着】【意】【识】【的】【清】【晰】。 【如】【葱】【削】【白】【的】【手】【落】【在】【贺】【宇】【的】【魂】【体】【上】，【苏】【染】【同】【时】【闭】【上】【了】【眼】【睛】